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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explore the drivers of startups’ survival in turbulent industries, characterized 
by  high  rates  of  entry  and  exit,  fragmented  market  shares,  and  a  rapid  pace  of  product 
innovation. Specifically, the paper aims to underscore the role played by post-entry product 
strategies, along with their interaction, beyond that of pre-entry conditions. Based on a sample 
of  270  startups  that  entered  the  Security  Software  Industry  from  1989  till  1998,  we  find 
evidence that surviving entities are those that more aggressively adopt versioning and product 
portfolio strategies. Interesting enough, strategic learning seems to play a major role: Focusing 
on one of the two product strategies commands a higher survival probability than adopting a 
mixed strategy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The crucial role of entrepreneurship as a source of innovation and economic growth has been 
emphasized by Schumpeter since the 1930s (Schumpeter, 1934). More recently, the analysis of 
small and young firms has attracted increasing attention given the well-known difficulties of 
established firms to successfully compete in industries characterized by radical innovation and 
technological change (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). As a consequence, a large body of the managerial and economic literature has 
focused on understanding the reasons underpinning the creation of new firms and the drivers of 
their success, especially in technology-based industries (Shane, 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003).  
This paper  follows  in  this tradition,  and attempts to  shed novel evidence on the drivers of 
startups’ survival in turbulent industries, which are defined as industries where entry and exit 
barriers  are  small,  economies  of  scale  play  a  marginal  role,  and  firms’  competences  and 
strategies are placed under a fierce process of selection (Covin and Slevin, 1989; Schmanlensee, 
2000). Examples include the laser industry, the hard disk drive industry, semiconductors and 
biotechnology (Klepper, 2002; McKendrick et al., 2003; Barnett and Freeman, 2001). 
Specifically, the contribution of this research is to underscore the impact of post-entry strategies 
on startups’ survival beyond that of pre-entry factors and initial conditions, which have been 
identified  as  determinants  of  startups’  survival  by  the  existing  literature  (see  for  instance, 
Klepper, 2002). The focus on post-entry strategies becomes crucial in turbulent industries where 
firms that rest on their laurels, i.e. pre-entry factors and initial conditions, are condemned to a 
premature exit. It is worth noting that the analysis of post-entry strategies by startups is rather 
rare in the literature (see recently Stern and Henderson, 2004). There is a clear reason: When 
dealing  with  startups,  data  are  difficult  to  collect  and  they  are  scarcely  cooperative.  As  a 
consequence, little is known about this issue. This work aims to fill this gap by relying on a 
novel self-assembled dataset on products introduction in the Security Software Industry (SSI), a 
relatively recent segment of the software industry.  
SSI represents a prototypical example of turbulent industries and an interesting test-bed for 
several reasons: i) it is a technology-based industry where product innovation plays a major   3 
role; ii) since its inception, it has displayed an astonishing level of entry and exit, with little sign 
of  consolidation  around  a  few  large  players;  iii)  entry  and  exit  barriers  as  well  as  scale 
economies  are  rather  low;  iv)  competition  takes  place  mostly  among  startups,  whereas 
incumbent firms are marginal players.
1  
Building upon the product life cycle theory (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) we argue that in 
turbulent industries pre-entry factors and initial conditions might be less useful in explaining 
survival  than  they  are  in  more  stable  industries.  By  contrast,  post-entry  strategies,  i.e.  the 
moves, actions, decisions taken after entry, become critical to guarantee the long term success 
of the new entity. Specifically, we focus on the post-entry strategies pursued in the product 
space,  which  are  likely  to  be  crucial  in  high-tech  industries  where  the  pace  of  product 
innovation  is  extremely  high.  Drawing  on  a  sample  of  270  startups  that  have  entered  our 
reference industry since its birth in 1989, we find evidence that surviving startups are those that 
actively  increase  the  scope  of  their  product  portfolio  or  adopt  an  aggressive  mono-niche 
versioning strategy. Moreover, focusing either on a versioning strategy or a product portfolio 
strategy  commands a  higher  survival  probability than adopting  a  mixed  strategy. So,  stable 
strategic orientation helps startups increase their survival probability. We find this result in line 
with the strategic learning literature (Kuwada, 1998). Interestingly enough, other things being 
equal, early entrants do not command a significantly higher likelihood of surviving, whereas 
technological capabilities play an important role. 
This paper is related to several streams of literature. Some research on startups has focused on 
the reasons behind firm creation. Indeed, firm formation has been associated with industry-level 
factors, such as market structure (Audretsch, 1991), technology regimes (Winter, 1984) and 
technological  opportunities  (Shane,  2001)  or  with  individual-level  factors,  such  as  the 
psychology of entrepreneurs (Roberts, 1991) and career experience (Carroll and Masakowski, 
1987). In this paper our attention moves from the factors that support firm creation to those that 
foster startup survival. In turbulent environments, the real challenge for young firms with scarce 
initial financial and organizational resources, resides in how they are able to turn into a profit 
the idea that pushed entry (Bhide, 2000).    4 
While several investigations have already studied industry-level determinants of survival, such 
as  sector characteristics, IPRs regimes, availability of venture capital, etc. (Gans and Stern, 
2003; Chesbrough, 2000), much less is known about firm-specific drivers of survival. The only 
robust “historical” result on which the literature agrees is that survival is directly influenced by 
firm age and size (Wagner, 1994; Mata and Machado, 1996). But dealing with startups, size and 
age represent far too a grainy lens. Recently, some authors have highlighted the role of initial 
capabilities (differently measured) and entry timing as the two most important determinants of 
startups’ survival (Klepper, 2002). As a step further, our research aims to underscore the impact 
of post-entry product strategies beyond that of pre-entry controls on the likelihood of startups’ 
survival in an industry where entry barriers and scale economies are small.  
From  a  different  tradition,  population  ecologists  have  also  analyzed  the  impact  of  product 
strategies  on  firms’  survival  probability  (Sorenson,  2000;  Dobrev  et  al.,  2001;  Barnett  and 
Freeman,  2001).  For  instance,  Sorenson  (2000)  considers  the  interaction  between  product 
strategy  and  environmental  turbulence,  whereas  Barnett  and  Freeman  (2001)  distinguish 
between the static and the dynamic effects of product introduction. This stream of research has 
typically focused on industries dominated by large diversified firms (e.g. cars, workstations, 
etc.) and has overlooked the role played by firm-specific pre-entry conditions, which have been 
the major concern of the traditional industrial organization perspective discussed above.  
Our paper constitutes therefore an attempt to test simultaneously for the validity of the two 
traditions using as a test-bed a young industry where the dominant organizational form is the 
new venture. 
Finally, this article provides one of the few systematic empirical studies aimed at understanding 
the drivers of startups’ survival in turbulent environments, where large and established firms 
find difficult to flourish (Hall, 1980; Covin and Slevin, 1989; D’Aveni, 1994; Thomas, 1996). 
Other  notable  exceptions  are  Lieberman  (2003)  who  focuses  on  the  Dot-Com  sector  and 
Makadok (1998) who studies the money market mutual fund industry. One virtue of our paper is 
that we have managed to assemble a dataset that covers the whole history of SSI since its birth   5 
in 1989, with a comprehensive account of different strategic moves in the product space by 
virtually all the industry players.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section builds the theoretical 
background and derives our hypotheses. Section 3 takes a brief detour into the salient traits of 
SSI,  and  describes  the  sample  and  the  methodology.  Section  4  discusses  our  findings  and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Following the seminal work of William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback (1978), several 
scholars  have  focused  their  attention  on  the  way  industries  evolve  and  its  implications  for 
strategy. Most industries are believed to follow an evolutionary pattern known as the “product 
life cycle”. A salient characteristic of this pattern is that after an initial period of very intensive 
entry and exit, and highly fragmented market shares, the industry is subject to a “shake-out” 
phase, which leads to higher concentration, fewer opportunities to improve the products and the 
emergence of a dominant design (Klepper, 2002; Geroski, 1995). Indeed, with the aim to reduce 
production costs, the focus of firms’ rivalry shifts from product to process innovation. This 
obliges the firms to invest more in capital-intensive methods of production, which reinforces the 
shake-out  of  producers by increasing the minimum efficient size  firm. In this  phase  of  the 
product life cycle, scale economies and learning effects overtake any competitive advantage 
stemming from innovation of de-novo entrants. Empirical research has demonstrated that in 
shake-out environments initial capabilities, time of entry and exploitation of scale and learning 
economies are the most important determinants of firms’ survival (Klepper, 2002).  
Some  recent  evidence  has  however  highlighted  that  the  pattern  described  above  is  not  as 
ubiquitous as it has been initially suggested. The laser industry, the hard disk drive industry, 
semiconductors and biotechnology offer good  examples of how  entry and  exit rates remain 
intense during the whole industry life (McKendrick et al., 2003; Barnett and Freeman, 2001). In 
addition, in recent years, some industries have evolved from oligopolistic stable environments 
to turbulent ones (Lampel and Shamsie, 2003). Such tumultuous industries are characterized by   6 
low  access barriers  and  by  a  very  fragmented  market structure. Consequently, they tend to 
display high rates of entry and exit that do not level off. Product innovation plays a crucial role, 
whereas process innovation tends to be of minor importance since competitive advantages can 
hardly be grounded on cost benefits. New versions and product categories proliferate rapidly 
making obsolete old established product generations. Since there is little investment in capital-
intensive methods of production, the minimum efficient size of the firm can be small and shake-
out phases do not need to materialize. In the literature, this typology of industries, that we label 
turbulent, goes usually under different names, like hypercompetitive (D’Aveni, 1994), hostile 
(Covin and Slevin, 1989) and Schumpeterian (Schmalensee, 2000).  
This  distinction  between  shake-out  and  turbulent  industries,  although  painted  with  a  broad 
brush,  it  helps  highlight  the  important  differences  in  strategic  conduct  between  the  two.  In 
shake-out industries, the role of management is to build and defend a long-term sustainable 
advantage. As the evidence suggests, superior performances in these industries are most likely 
to be driven by cost advantages based on the exploitation of scale economies with pre-entry 
factors like entry time and initial capabilities playing a crucial role. By contrast, in turbulent 
industries, there is “a fundamental shift in the rules of competition and the way the game of 
competition  is  played”  (Ilinitch,  D’Aveni  and  Lewin,  1996).  Successful  firms  need  to 
continuously renew their competitive advantage and rely on dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997). By creating a constantly changing series of small, temporary competitive advantages, 
firms manage to keep competitors off balance by forcing them to respond (Makadok, 1998).  
Although the existing literature on shake-out industries has provided quite a lot of evidence on 
the importance of pre-entry factors and initial conditions for the survival of firms (Klepper, 
2002), it has downplayed the role of post-entry strategies, i.e. the moves, actions, decisions 
taken after entry. Post-entry strategies are particularly important in turbulent industries where 
firms that rest on their laurels are condemned to a premature exit. In this paper, we focus on this 
understudied portion of the literature. Precisely, we aim at quantifying the impact of post-entry 
strategies  beyond  that  of  initial  conditions,  pre-entry  factors  and  other  possible  ex-ante   7 
determinants of survival in an industry where the rate of turbulence does not seem to diminish 
across time.  
We will focus on the post-entry strategies pursued by startups in the product space, and their 
interaction. Our decision to choose product strategies is twofold. First, product introduction 
represents  a  measurable  and  visible  (especially  for  competitors)  realization  of  the  firm’s 
strategy, and so it takes a primary position inside the range of strategic moves of a company 
(Siggelkow, 2003). Second, product strategies are extremely important for new ventures that 
usually build their reputation on the type of products they introduce (Kazanjian and Rao, 1999; 
Debruyne et al., 2002). For example, Meyer and Roberts (1986) have found product strategies 
to be key for the success of small technology-based firms. In addition, turbulent industries are 
characterized by substantial rates of product innovation, and firms that are not proactive in the 
product space tend to face serious difficulties in their struggle to survive. Meyer and Roberts 
(1986), Sorenson (2000) and Siggelkow (2003) among others, identify two main strategies that 
firms can implement in the product space: 1) versioning, a niche strategy that implies focusing 
on  a  particular  sub-segment  of  the  market,  and  taking  continuous  steps  of  incremental 
improvements  of  the  same  product;  and  2)  product  portfolio  broadening,  an  intra-industry 
product diversification strategy. Marketing scholars would label them as the vertical and the 
horizontal dimensions of a firm’s product line.  
Versioning is an important strategy for two main reasons. First, given the usually low entry 
barriers in turbulent industries, incumbents are often threatened in their core product niches by 
new entrants endowed with innovative products. By keeping its core products always updated 
and at  the technological frontier, the  firm can  signal its  intention  and ability to disrupt  the 
market periodically, implying that eventually a new breakthrough product will replace the actual 
standard (Smith et al., 1997). Competitors are forced to play continuous catch-up, and invest 
heavily to improve product quality.  
Second, when consumer preferences are fragmented, versioning represents a way to segment 
customers without cannibalizing the existing product (Shapiro and Varian, 1998).  For instance, 
early versions commanding high prices can be commercialized to costumers who quickly need   8 
the products, whereas later versions with decreasing prices are meant to attract a broader base of 
customers. Hence, we posit: 
 
H1. In turbulent industries, startups that adopt a strategy of aggressive product versioning in a 
specific niche exhibit a higher survival rate. 
 
Product  portfolio broadening implies offering a large  menu of products  from different sub-
segments of the product space. Especially in highly dynamic industries, firms might signal an 
aggressive behavior by entering a large number of product niches. Moreover, product portfolio 
broadening could be used to raise entry barriers (Lancaster, 1990), an important strategic move 
when there are no initial sunk costs. By saturating the product space, the firm makes more 
difficult for de-novo competitors to enter in niches already populated.  
Portfolio broadening might also help generate positive technological synergies that increase the 
overall quality of the firm’s product offer. Indeed, when the rate of product obsolescence is 
high, the possibility to exploit economies of scale is limited. However, firms might try to exploit 
economies of scope by applying their technological capabilities to different niches.  
Synergies might also come from the consumer side. Portfolio broadening could also be the 
necessary condition to pursue a bundling strategy. According to Gandal et al. (2002), product 
bundling leads to superior performance either when consumer preferences for different products 
are positively correlated, or if the main customers are organizations that average multiple agent 
preferences. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) argue that bundling unrelated goods can be highly 
profitable since it becomes easier to predict consumers’ valuations for a bundle of goods than 
their valuations when the goods are sold separately. Finally, bundling could be also used to 
extract rents from low quality products that are shadowed by high quality ones inside product 
packages (Kenney and Klein, 1983; Randall et al., 1998).  
 
H2. In turbulent industries, startups that adopt an aggressive strategy of product portfolio 
broadening exhibit a higher survival rate.   9 
 
At this point, some interesting and unanswered questions naturally arise: How do the strategies 
of versioning and product portfolio broadening interact with each other? Are there synergies in 
pursuing both strategies at the same time? Or do the firms that focus on any of the two strategies 
end up enjoying a competitive advantage? Since startups are by definition small firms with 
limited resources and no organizational experience, the direction of their strategic orientation, 
i.e. a selected strategy vis-à-vis a mix of different strategies, should play a crucial role on the 
likelihood of survival.  
To surmise the potential interaction between the two strategies, we resort to the literature on 
organizational learning, and more specifically to the concept of strategic learning (Kuwada, 
1998; Thomas et al., 2001). Strategic learning aims to generate knowledge in support of future 
strategic  initiatives  that  will,  in  turn,  produce  differences  in  organizational  performances. 
Strategic  learning  becomes  even  more  important  for  startups  that  have  to  create  their 
organizational blueprints ex nihilo. Strategic learning, as well as organizational learning more in 
general, tends to increase through a continuous process of information accumulation. A critical 
component of this process is strategy repetition (Kuwada, 1998). Repetition is intended as the 
stable and frequent use of the same strategy. Since learning shows usually increasing returns 
phenomena (March, 1991), our underlining assumption is that learning returns diminish if firms 
disperse their “learning investments” along different strategy trajectories.  To fix ideas, take two 
similar firms that invest the same amount K (K could be any resource: Money, time, managers 
or researchers) in two possible strategies, A and B. The first firm puts all the efforts in only one 
strategy. The other invests a portion a (0 < a <1) in strategy A and a portion (1-a) in strategy B. 
Regardless of the direct outcomes of A and B, if the return from strategic learning (L) has the 
form L=f (K) with f’>0 and f’’>0, where f is a function that expresses increasing returns, it 
could easily be that, under some reasonable conditions, fA(K ) or fB(K) > fA(a*K) + fB[(1-a)*K] 
for every value of a.   10 
The returns from strategic learning could be poor if a firm fragments its available resources, 
typically  scarce  for  a  startup,  through a  variety  of  strategic  trajectories. In other words,  an 
attempt to cover a wide range of market niches while deepening the firm’s core product line 
might  be  detrimental  for  strategic  learning  opportunities,  especially  for  highly  resource 
constrained firms. Indeed, Pelham (1999) finds that generic strategic selection for small firms 
produces weaker competitive advantages, given the resource limitations of these organizations. 
Similarly, Covin and Slevin (1989) suggest that a clear definition of strategic postures produces 
the internal cohesiveness necessary to sustain the performance of small firms.  
This line of reasoning leads to our last hypothesis: 
 
H3. In turbulent industries, startups that focus on one type of strategy (either versioning or 
product portfolio broadening) exhibit a higher survival rate compared to those adopting a 
mixed strategy.  
 
3. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND, SAMPLE AND DATA 
3.1 Industry Background 
The Security Software Industry (SSI) provides the test bed for our hypotheses. SSI is a recent 
niche of the  software  industry,  a  quintessential  example  of  turbulent environments (Torrisi, 
1998).
2 SSI has experienced an unprecedented growth in recent years. The world market of SSI 
reached 4.4 billon dollars in 1999 from 3.2 billion dollars in 1998 and 2.2 billion dollars in 1997 
(International Data Corporation, 1999).   
The  origins  of  the  industry  date  back  to  the  late  70s,  when  the  US  government  directed 
important investments in military projects linked to the security of data transmission. Large 
firms, like IBM and AT&T, and academic research laboratories, especially at MIT and Stanford, 
worked  actively  on  software  security  architectures,  and  developed  and  patented  the  major 
technological breakthroughs. Almost all basic patents have expired at the beginning of the 90s. 
At the end of the 80s, the rising market of home personal computers and the development of the   11 
Internet  created  a  growing  civilian  demand,  increasing  the  spectrum  and  the  complexity  of 
different products and services required.  
Figure 1 shows the number of firms that entered and exited SSI and the observed hazard rates. 
This graph highlights the high industry turbulence, given the steady increase in the rates of entry 
and exit all over the period.  In part this can be explained by the relatively small sunk costs 
needed to start a SSI venture; for example, the initial amount invested to set up Check Point, the 
fourth largest firm in SSI (1998), was only $300,000. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
A  distinctive  feature  of  this  industry  is  that  the  large  firms,  that  were  the  first  technology 
movers, were very slow to enter in the new civilian market and SSI became dominated by 
startups. Table 1 lists the most important world market leaders after ten years of life of SSI; it is 
worth noticing that no large incumbents appear in this list, and all market leaders are startups. 
By  the  year  2000  large  incumbent  firms,  like  IBM  and  HP,  are  just  new  entrants  and 
insignificant players in this industry, which also legitimates our focus on startups.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To date, SSI includes a wide range of products: from the basic security software, such as Virtual 
Private Networks, Firewall and Virus Scanning to advanced security services like Public Key 
Infrastructures, Security Certification and Penetration Testing. Table 2 shows the major product 
niches in SSI according to a six digit SIC code classification.   
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The design of the general security protection of an information system is a complex project and 
it  incorporates  solutions  of  problems  originated  from  different  technological  fields  such  as 
mathematics, software, hardware and network design. The technological core of the product is 
the “crypto algorithm", which specifies the mathematical transformations that are performed on 
data. A crypto algorithm is a procedure that takes the plain text data and transforms it into 
cipher  text.  The  process  could  be  reversed  with  a  usual  password.  Speed  of  mathematical 
calculations and security level are the two main features on which SSI products are evaluated, 
because the time consumed by encrypting and decrypting processes depends on the length of   12 
mathematical algorithm and on the power of computing machines (Smith, 1999; Giarratana, 
2004). The crypto algorithm is the principal object of a firm' s patent under the technological 
patent class “cryptology”. The main buyers of SSI products are large hardware and software 
producers, credit card makers and telecommunication companies. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Our sample is composed by all firms that have introduced at least one product in SSI. Product 
introduction data were taken from Infotrac' s General Business File ASAP and PROMT database 
that, from a large set of trade journals, magazines and other specialized press, reports several 
categories of “events” like product introductions, strategic alliances and licenses classified by 
industrial sectors. This database is the new version of the old Predicast database that has been 
used extensively in the literature. We searched for all press articles that reported a “Product 
announcement",  a  “New  software  release"  and  a  “Software  evaluation"  in  SSI  (SIC  Code 
73726) from 1980 to 2000. Then, from each of these articles, we extracted the name of the 
company, the date of product introduction and the precise SIC code of the product (six digit SIC 
code). We found that the first product was introduced in 1989. We ended up with 411 different 
entrants in SSI. To control for firms’ group structure we used information from the Business 
and Company Resource Center database, Gale Group' s Infotrac. We have constructed ‘‘super 
firms’’ which correspond to the end-of-period actual entities. Hence, for example, if any two 
sample firms merged during the sample period, we consider them merged from the start (see for 
this procedure, Klepper, 2002). Specifically, in SSI there have been 79 mergers among startups. 
In  order  to  moderate  the  classical  censoring  problem  of  survival  analyses,  we  preferred  to 
restrict our sample to the firms that entered from 1989 to 1998; this selection eliminates too 
young entrants - the 1999 and 2000 cohorts - reducing censoring issues. As a matter of fact, our 
conservative procedure allows us to track the existence and the product strategies of the 1989-98 
entrants in the two years following the end of our sample period (1998). This criterion gives us 
a sample of 270 firms that entered in SSI from 1989 to 1998.    13 
By checking firms’ histories from different sources, we found that these 270 entrants are all 
start-ups in SSI. This confirms that SSI is mainly dominated by start-ups and incumbents are 
latecomers and play a marginal role. The 270 start-ups have introduced 1,125 different products. 
All the products were classified in 6 different niches (see Table 2). We also cleaned for eventual 
product double-counting (i.e. articles that cite the same event).  
 
3.3 Econometric Models 
A wide collection of empirical works provides a standard econometric approach to deal with 
survival  (Geroski,  1995;  Audretsch,  1991;  Klepper,  2002).  Logit  models  for  selection  and 
duration models for survival are the most common techniques employed in the literature. A logit 
specification assumes that the probability to exit is influenced by a series of covariates. Usually, 
the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm is exited, and 0 otherwise. Duration models 
were initially imported from biology to analyze individual jumps in and out unemployment 
cohorts (see Wooldrigde, 2002). These models are based on hazard functions, i.e. distribution 
functions  of  the  duration  or  spell  length  for  an  individual,  F(t)  =  Pr(T<t),  where  T  is  the 
duration, and are used to estimate the rates at which spells are completed at duration t, given 
that they have lasted until t.  Even if the empirical literature offers a variety of parametric 
duration  models  such  as  exponential  and  Weibull,  the  proportional  hazard  models  (Cox 
specification) are better suited when hazard rates change with the duration, showing period of 
hazard acceleration and deceleration (Kiefer, 1988).  
 
3.4 Dependent Variables 
Exit. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has exited the industry by the 
year  2000  and  0  otherwise.  We  triangulated  different  databases  to  obtain  this  information. 
Precisely, we checked for the firm’s existence by the year 2000: i) in the US (www.uspto.gov) 
and European (oami.eu.int) Trademark Databases looking for firms’ “live” software trademarks   14 
after 12/31/1998;
3 ii) in some financial databases – Hoover’s (www.hoovers.com), Mergent on 
Line (www.mergentonline.com), Bureau Van Djik’s  Orbis (www.bvdep.com) – for any firm’s 
balance sheet after the financial year 1998; iii) in Infotrac Company Resource Data Center and 
in Infotrac PROMT for any press article that included news of firms after 1998. This is our 
dependent variable in the logit specifications.  
Duration. The length of time that elapses from entry either until exit or until 2000. Since we do 
not have the precise date of exit of the firm, we introduced a simple criterion to track firms’ exit 
date (see for this procedure Breschi et al., 2003). Exit date was assigned if a firm did not release 
any new version of an existing product or a brand new product for two years. There are no cases 
in the data of firms that after a period of more than two years of inactivity released again new 
products in SSI. There is still a censoring problem for all firms that are active by the year 2000, 
whose exit might take place somewhere in the future. This is our dependent variable in the Cox 
specifications. 
 
3.5 Predictor Variables 
Versioning. This variable (Versioning) counts the average annual number of new versions of 
the product that spurt firm’s entry in SSI either during the firm’s lifetime or till 2000. This 
means that if CheckPoint entered in SSI in 1994 introducing a Firewall and exited in 2000, we 
computed how many new versions of this product CheckPoint has released till 2000 and divided 
it by the number of surviving years (number of products in the entry niche/firm’s life span). 
Firm’s entry product niche is particularly important for startups because it usually creates a 
strong reputation effect and sustains the competitive advantage in the preliminary phases of 
competition  (Kazanjian  and  Rao,  1999).  Moreover,  niche  specialization  strategy  is  usually 
pursued in the niche that characterized entry (Debruyne et al., 2002). At the same time, our 
direct interviews with some startups’ managers confirm the importance of building up the firm’s 
reputation around the product that has spurt entry (see also Giarratana, 2004). 
Product portfolio broadening. We proxy this variable with two different measures. The first 
(Portfolio)  counts  the  average  annual  number  of  products  the  firm  has  released  in  niches   15 
different from its entry niche either during the firm’s lifetime or till 2000. As before, we divided 
the  number  of  products  by  the  firm’s  time  of  permanence  on  the  market.  The  second 
(Herfindahl) is the Herfindahl index of the firm’s product portfolio at the end of the sample 
period. By construction, this measure varies between 0 and 1, and decreases the larger is the 
degree of intra-industry diversification.  
Mixed  strategy.  Our  aim  is  to  test  if  the  strategies  of  versioning  and  product  portfolio 
broadening show any interaction with each other. Empirically we can address this issue simply 
by  constructing  a  new  covariate  equal  to  the  product  (Mixed=Versioning*Portfolio)  of  the 
versioning and product portfolio variables.
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3.6 Control Variables 
First  mover  advantages.  A  large  body  of  the  literature  has  analyzed  and  measured  the 
magnitude  and  sustainability  of  first-mover  and  early-mover  advantages  (Lieberman  and 
Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Mitchell, 1991). In SSI, where entry and exit barriers are low, and 
scale economies are less important, the sustainability paradigm of the first-mover advantage is 
under the most severe test (Gandal, 2001; Lieberman, 2003). Nonetheless, early movers in SSI 
might  benefit  from  the  existence  of  the  same  users’  switching  costs  that  characterize  the 
software industry as a whole (Torrisi, 1998). Users who want to move to a different software 
provider  might  need  to  learn  how  the  new  supplier’s  product  works,  an  investment  that  is 
already  sunk  with  the  software  product  in  use.  Early-movers  might  also  benefit  from  a 
reputation effect. Established firms that offer a solution that works have an advantage over new 
competitors whose product offer is characterized by higher uncertainty. In some niches of SSI, 
for instance antivirus, not only it is important to offer a high quality product, suppliers might 
have also to convince prospective buyers that they will be able to update their products in the 
incoming future. Established firms with a built reputation might be more trustworthy. To test for 
the presence of first-mover advantages we follow the standard approach in the literature (see, 
for instance, Klepper, 2002) and create two cohort dummies (Cohort1 and Cohort2). Since we 
have a total of 10 years of industry life,  Cohort1 and Cohort2 take the value 1 if a startup has   16 
entered in the period 1989-1991 (the first 3 years) and in the period 1992-1994 (the second three 
years) respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
Technological  capabilities.  In  turbulent  environments  firms  endowed  with  “dynamic 
capabilities”, i.e. firms able to continuously achieve new forms of competitive advantage, have 
an edge over competitors in the fight to survive (Teece et al., 1997). In SSI, due to its science-
based  nature,  one  of  the  leading  dynamic  capabilities  is  technological  soundness.  A  deep 
technological background and innovative capability is therefore a necessary condition to short-
term survival and long-run performance. We use a dummy variable (Technology) that takes the 
value of 1 if the startup was a technological supplier in a license agreement or if it was granted a 
patent at the US Patent Office. Patent data were downloaded from the US Patent Office web 
site. We considered all the patents granted in the US class 380 (Cryptography). Information 
about  licenses  was  drawn  from  the  same  database  used  for  product  introduction.  We 
downloaded all the “licensing contracts” classified under the Security Software Sector. We also 
added to each firm the active (Seller) or passive (Buyer) role in the contract, by extracting the 
information from the article text.  
Though “Technology” could be subject to some endogeneity criticisms, since firms surviving 
longer have more chances to supply technology or file a patent, it is worth noticing that 54% of 
the sample firms were granted a patent and 41% had signed a license  contract before they 
actually  entered  the  market  with  a  product.  This  provides  good  evidence  that  our  variable 
measures an initial capability. As a matter of fact, given the good functioning of the market for 
technology in SSI, firms can easily obtain revenues by licensing their crypto algorithms. Indeed, 
in 1998, 14.9% of total sales of the 15 market leaders came from licensing algorithm contracts.   
Partnering. This variable (Alliance) counts the annual average number of alliances that a firm 
signed during its life span. Information about alliances was again drawn from Infotract PROMT 
and ASAP. We downloaded all the “strategic alliances” and “joint ventures” classified under the 
Security Software Sector. We have included all strategic alliances in research and development, 
marketing  and distribution that do not involve  an active role as technology supplier by the 
startup.   17 
We add the partnering control following the recent literature on startups that has stressed the 
importance of active partnering for usually resource constrained firms. Partnering can be used to 
shorten  product  development  time  by  quickly  learning  complementary  technological 
competencies  and  exploiting  research  synergies  (Miotti  and  Sachwald,  2003).  Alliances, 
especially  with  big  partners,  could  be  an  optimal  vehicle  to  share  costs,  improve  market 
penetration and diminish risks among startups (Gans and Stern, 2003). Finally, partnering can 
be a means to penetrate market niches that are outside the startup’s core activity. For example, 
Sakakibara  (1997)  argues  that  competence  complementarities  between  partners  foster  the 
alliance’s  success.    By  leveraging  the  experience,  reputation  and  knowledge  of  other firms 
already active in the new niche, the company can improve market penetration and reduce the 
risk of failure. Partnering can therefore be a strategy for broadening the startup’s product offer. 
Industry conditions. We control for average revenues in the industry at the time of entry. The 
variable (Industry) is time varying and it is constructed dividing the total revenues generated in 
SSI in a given year by the number of active firms in that year. Total SSI revenues generated by 
year are taken from Hoover’s (www.hoovers.com).  
US startup. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the startup is a US firm, and 0 
otherwise. 
Niches.  We  control for  systematic  differences  across  entry  niches  through  a  set  of  dummy 
variables.  
Table  3  describes  the  variables  used  as  covariates,  and  table  4  reports  means,  standard 
deviations and correlations. 
[TABLE 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. RESULTS 
Table 5 reports the results of the logit estimations. Model 1 includes “Portfolio” as a proxy for 
product portfolio broadening, whereas model 2 uses our variable “Herfindahl”.  
 [TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]   18 
Our hypotheses gain support from the data since firms that introduce a higher annual average 
number of versions of their original product or a higher annual average number of products 
belonging to different market niches command a much higher probability to survive. Note that 
we obtain similar results using either “Portfolio” or “Herfindahl”. To check the robustness of 
these latter findings, we have experimented with alternative measures of versioning and product 
portfolio broadening. For instance, we have used two dummies that took the value of 1 if the 
startup introduced at least a new version and at least a product in a different niche, respectively, 
in its first year of activity. We also measured the time that elapsed from entry till a new version 
was released or till entry in a new niche occurred, respectively, adjusted by the duration of the 
startup’s presence in SSI. All these different specifications lead to similar qualitative results.  
The  interaction  covariate  “Mixed”  has  a  significant  and  negative  impact  on  the  survival 
probability. This finding suggests that for startups with usually scarce resources, focusing on 
one  type  of  strategy  (versioning  or  product  portfolio  broadening)  commands  a  higher 
probability of surviving than adopting a mixed strategy. Hence, a firm that is “stuck in the 
middle” has a lower chance to survive than focused rivals because the hazard of exit increases if 
firms shift from a focused strategy to a mixed one. Indeed, the opportunities of accumulating 
strategic learning are reduced if a firm with scarce resources disperses its learning investments 
across different strategy trajectories (Kuwada, 1998). To better quantify this finding, consider 
the following experiment: a startup can choose between a mixed strategy in which it reaches 
half of the observed maximum (see Table 4.a) in versioning (Versioning=2.18) and product 
portfolio  broadening  (Portfolio=3),  and  a  focused  strategy  in  which  it  obtains  the  observed 
maximum  (Portfolio=6  and  Versioning=4.37)  in  either  “Portfolio”  or  “Versioning”  and  the 
minimum  (Portfolio=0.07  and  Versioning=0.14)  in  the  other  dimension.  A  focused  strategy 
decreases the hazard of exit between 39% and 42% depending on the strategy chosen. This 
suggests two possible routes for startups’ survival in SSI: a) a niche product leadership, i.e. 
specializing with an aggressive versioning in a particular niche and keeping the product at the 
technological frontier; b) the one-stop shop strategy, i.e. offering a complete security package to   19 
the customers, which includes also consultancy services.  It is worth noting that about a third of 
the revenues of the top 15 startups in SSI comes from consultancy services. 
In  order  to  check  for  the  relevance  of  post-entry  product  strategies,  we  perform  a  LR  test 
comparing the two models with a more spare specification that uses only control variables. At 
the 5% significance  level,  the  LR test suggests that  “Versioning”, “Portfolio”  and “Mixed” 
should not be dropped (the values of the statistics are 44.94 and 38.16 respectively). 
As far as it concerns our control variables, our dummy for early industry entrants (Cohort1) is 
not significant at all, suggesting that firms that have entered SSI in its early days do not show a 
higher probability to survive. This result seems quite robust. Indeed, we have experimented with 
different time windows for early entrants and with a time trend ( = 1999 – year of startup’s 
entry), obtaining always insignificant coefficients. After all, it is not surprising that first-mover 
advantages  are  not  important  in  this  industry.  First-mover  advantages  tend  to  be  typically 
associated  with  shake-out  industries  where  early  entrants  end  up  enjoying  larger  scale  and 
learning  economies,  and benefiting  from network  and  reputation  effects. Indeed,  only weak 
evidence of first-mover advantages has shown up in the really few studies focused on turbulent 
industries (Makadok, 1998; Gandal, 2001; Lieberman, 2003). In SSI, first-mover advantages are 
less likely to matter because the industry is characterized by strong product-based competition 
centered on the “quality” of the technology. In fact, most of the product demand is driven by 
large ICT incumbents who represent high-skilled selective customers with low switching costs 
among different programs. Moreover, important patents on basic knowledge, granted in the late 
1970s, have already expired.  
As expected, technological capabilities play an important role in shaping startups’ probability of 
survival.  If  all  other  variables  are  held  at  their  mean  values,  entrants  endowed  with 
technological  capabilities  are  16.9%  more  likely  to  survive  than  entrants  without  such 
capabilities (using estimates from model 1).  
Startups that engage in active partnering do not seem to be more likely to survive. At its face 
value, this finding would imply that strategic alliances help very little startups in increasing 
survival probability. There are several plausible explanations for this result. The most obvious is   20 
that strategic alliances might be instrumental to achieve strategies of versioning and product 
portfolio broadening. To prove this conjecture, we perform a test for mediation according to the 
procedure in Baron and Kenney (1986). Mediation is a hypothesized causal link in which one 
variable affects a second variable that, in turn, affects a third variable. In so doing, we perform 
other two regressions with the same controls. First, we see that “Portfolio” and “Versioning” 
remain significant and with the expected sign if we drop “Alliance” from the logistic regression 
in Table 6. Then, we employ as dependent variables of a standard OLS regression “Portfolio” 
and “Versioning”, and as predictors, all our controls plus “Alliance” (see Appendix). “Alliance” 
appears to be significant at 5% level in both regressions and with a positive sign. Using these 
estimates, we perform the Sobel (1982) and the Goodman (1960) tests (see Table 6), which 
confirm that our data are consistent with a mediation model in which alliances are instruments 
to pursue product strategies.  
The estimates obtained from the duration models (Cox specification) can be found in Table 7. 
Results are overall consistent with the logit estimations. At a given time t, firms endowed with 
technological capabilities and that are engaged in focused strategies of versioning and portfolio 
broadening command a higher probability to last longer. There is no significant benefit of being 
a first mover in the industry, nor of being very active in partnering with other firms.  
 [TABLE 6 AND TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
In this  paper we have  empirically investigated the  determinants  of  startups’ survival in  the 
Security Software Industry, a prototypical example of a turbulent industry. Our findings suggest 
that  post-entry  strategies  of  versioning  and  product  portfolio  broadening  are  important  in 
explaining the survival of the new ventures even after controlling for initial entry conditions. 
The  analysis  of  post-entry  product  strategies  beyond  traditional  determinants  of  startups’ 
survival constitutes our contribution to the existing literature. Moreover, our results seem to 
confirm that coherence and focus in post-entry strategies command a higher rate of survival. 
These  findings,  in  addition  to  being  interesting  per  se,  are  most  valuable  given  the  scarce   21 
empirical literature on startups’ survival in turbulent industries and their post-entry strategies. 
At this regard, our work constitutes an attempt to bridge the gap between the standard industrial 
organization studies on firms’ survival (see Klepper, 2002) and the tradition that more directly 
refers to population ecology studies (see Dobrev et al., 2001). 
As secondary findings, we show that in turbulent industries, like SSI, first mover advantages are 
not significant, whereas we confirm the important role played by technological capabilities. We 
think that this evidence is driven by the particular characteristics of turbulent industries, that is, 
industries with low entry barriers and scarce scale economies, but with a fierce competition on 
technology-based products. Finally, partnering intensity does not seem to have a direct effect on 
the survival of new entities, although we show that alliances might be instrumental for pursuing 
product strategies. 
Our findings have several implications for practitioners. As far as it concerns pre-entry initial 
conditions, without reliable first mover advantages, in turbulent environments initial capabilities 
remain pivotal to guarantee survival in the early stages of the firm’s life. This means that “high 
quality” entrants do not find it difficult to compete also in later stages of industry evolution, and 
that entry barriers are more on the product-quality side. Indeed, it is difficult to observe “lock-
in” effects and firms’ technological capabilities are exposed to a higher degree of selection. 
Taking this argument a step further, one could conjecture that when entrants are deprived of an 
important strategic tool as the time of entry, the embedded capabilities of startups are even more 
important. The only true lock-in effect seems to come from the selection of the firm’s strategy. 
Strategic learning has been shown to be very important for firms in general, and particularly for 
startup  organizations  with  scarce  resources.  The  dispersion  of  the  firm’s  resources  along  a 
variety of different strategies could decrease the returns from strategic learning and undermine 
the firm’s performance and stability (Kuwada, 1998). 
In short, the recipe for startups’ survival is a fine mix of pre-entry technological capabilities and 
stable post-entry product strategies. Other initial conditions strictly linked with scale economies 
like  entry  time  have  a  limited  importance.  Further  research  attempting  to  reproduce  these 
findings on similar industries (like laser, biotech, etc.) could strengthen these conjectures. At 
this regard, it is not trivial to stress that these trajectories to survival seem to be critical in 
industries  where  incumbent  diversified  firms  find  difficult  to  compete,  while  specialized 
startups dominate.   22 
Finally, we are well aware that this work shows some limitations. From a theoretical point of 
view,  we  have  used  the  distinction  between  shake-out  industry  and  turbulent  industries  to 
sharpen our discussion of the differences in strategic conduct between the two. First, the use of 
a  polar  characterization  is  not  meant  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  variety  of  “hybrid”  cases. 
Second, and most important, we rarely can count on the whole history of an industry from birth 
to death. So, we have no guarantee that a turbulent industry will no exhibit some shake-out in 
the future. Our conjecture, that we cannot prove, is that turbulent industries are structurally 
different from traditional shake-out industries, and this makes the shake-out unlikely. However, 
even if a shake-out might occur this would not diminish the empirical relevance of our study. 
Our results should then be interpreted in terms of the drivers of survival in the initial phases of 
the industry life cycle in which the competitive dynamics are quite different from those in later 
phases. After all, according to the literature (Klepper, 2002), firms that dominate the industry in 
the long run are those that entered and survived the first turbulent phase. From an econometric 
point  of  view,  problems  of  endogeneity  and  measurement  are  present:  for  instance, 
technological  capabilities  and  post-entry  strategies  could  indeed  be  proxies  of  the  same 
unobserved entrepreneurs’ ability. As a matter of fact, the two product strategies could depict 
two different “initial” blueprints (Baron and Hannan, 2002): i) a product-oriented startup that 
bases  its  competitive  advantages  on  the  technological  quality  of  one  product;  ii)  a  service-
oriented start-up that uses the intra-industry product diversification to build up a complete offer. 
Indeed, this confirms that direct, extensive surveys to startups could give information that with 
great difficulty could be extracted from the raw data. We are confident that these shortcomings 
could be addressed in future research.   23 
 End Notes 
1 Incumbents are defined as firms already competing in a sector outside the industry under 
scrutiny. 
2 This section draws upon Giarratana (2004) to which we refer for further details on the history 
and evolution of SSI. 
3 Trademarks granted are withdrawn if the firm is not actually using them in the market. As a 
matter of fact, since US and Europe represent the two most important markets for software 
products, firms that want to operate in these markets should own at least a “live” trademark 
there, regardless of their country origins. 
4 The product between the versioning variable and our second measure of product portfolio 
(Herfindahl) could not be used given the too high correlation with the versioning variable. The 
correlation biases the effect of the interaction term. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: World market leaders in SSI, 1998 
Rank  Firm  Revenues 
($ml) 
Net Income 
($ml) 
World 
 market share 
Entry 
Year 
1  Network Ass.  990  36.4  0.171  1993 
2  Symantec  578.4  85.1  0.099  1990 
3  RSA Data Security  171.3  29.4  0.029  1991 
4  Check Point  141.9  69.9  0.024  1995 
5  Rainbow Technology  109.2  2.5  0.018  1998 
6  Axent Technology  101  7.7  0.017  1994 
7  Trend Micro Devices  86.2  3.6  0.014  1991 
8  Secure Computing  61.4  -3.3  0.010  1994 
9  Entrust Techologies  49  -23.8  0.008  1997 
10  Cylink  42.8  5.1  0.007  1995 
11  SystemSoft  42.6  -19.7  0.007  1998 
12  VeriSign  38.9  -19.7  0.006  1998 
13  BindView  38.5  3.3  0.006  1995 
14  Aladdin  36.1  0.7  0.006  1997 
15  Safenet  23.2  -2.4  0.005  1998 
Total    2487.3  174.8  0.429   
Source: Hoover’s and Infotrac, see Giarratana (2004) 
 
 
Table 2: Product niches in SSI 
 Niche 
Description 
Authentication-Digital 
Signature 
Products for the authentication of digital documents with a 
copyrighted mark 
Antivirus  Programs that detect and clean viruses from computers 
Data and Hardware 
Protection 
Products aimed to secure the integrity of sensible data 
stored in hard drivers 
Firewalls  A sort of checking door between different networks 
Utility Software  Utility software programs that assure the protection and 
proper execution of the operating system and applications, 
giving the possibility to recreate the content of some data 
packages lost 
Network Security and 
Management 
Network security management packages that guarantee the 
high performing functioning of different networks  
Source: Our elaboration from Infotrac according to a six digit SIC code classification 
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Table 3: Covariates’ description. 
Label  Description 
Versioning  Firm i’s number of products released in the niche that corresponds to the 
firm’s entry niche, standardized by the time of market permanence of firm i 
Portfolio  Firm i’s number of products released in all the niches different from the niche 
that corresponds to the firm’s entry niche, standardized by the time of market 
permanence of firm i 
Mixed  The product of the variables “Portfolio” and “Versioning” 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl index calculated on firm i’s product portfolio at the end of the 
period 
Cohort1  Dummy for firms entered in the first cohort 1989-1991 
Cohort2  Dummy for firms entered in the second cohort 1992-1994 
Technology  Dummy for firms that were granted a patent or signed a license as a 
technology supplier (technology seller) 
Alliance  Number alliances signed by firm i, standardized by the time of market 
permanence of firm i 
Industry  Ratio between total SSI revenues at time “t” (million dollars) and the number 
of active firms at time “t”.  
US startup  Dummy for US firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlations of covariates 
  Mean  S. D.  Min  Max  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9. 
1. Versioning  0.432  0.394  0.143  4.38  1.00                 
2. Portfolio  0.280  0.560  0.071  6  0.19  1.00               
3. Herfindahl  0.895  0.205  0.193  1  -0.15  -0.51  1.00             
4. Cohort1  0.207  0.406  0  1  -0.24  0.07  -0.13  1.00           
5. Cohort2  0.578  0.495  0  1  0.14  -0.05  0.11  -0.60  1.00         
6. Alliance  0.119  0.324  0  1  0.29  0.38  -0.25  -0.10  -0.04  1.00       
7. Technology  0.581  1.451  0  14.5  0.21  0.46  -0.48  0.07  -0.06  0.45  1.00     
8. Industry  673  364  0  1078  0.19  -0.05  0.13  -0.69  0.14  0.13  -0.07  1.00   
9. US startup  0.744  0.437  0  1  0.03  0.05  -0.08  0.07  0.01  0.13  0.00  -0.12  1.00 
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Table 5: Results from logit estimation (exit probability-entrants from 1989 to 1998) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Versioning  -2.74**  0.55  -  - 
Portfolio  -7.99**  2.70  -2.09**  0.91 
Mixed  3.78**  1.43  1.69*  1.05 
Herfindahl  -  -  2.62**  1.30 
Cohort1  0.24  0.93  1.51  1.72 
Cohort2  0.40  1.66  0.41  0.87 
Technology  -2.02**  0.91  -1.97**  0.84 
Alliance  0.30  0.17  0.13  0.11 
Industry  -0.03  0.03  -0.01  0.02 
US startup  0.07  0.64  0.16  6.61 
Constant  9.84**  3.42  3.66  3.62 
Dummy variables 
for product niches 
YES  YES 
Observations  270  270 
LogLik.  -38.25  -41.64 
Note: * and ** mean 0.10 and 0.05 level of significance, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Results of the Sobel and Goodman tests for mediation  
  Portfolio  Product 
Sobel test  2.41**  2.57** 
Goodman test  2.36**  2.52** 
Note: * and ** mean 0.10 and 0.05 level of significance, respectively 
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Table 7: Results for Cox proportional Hazard model (Hazard of exit- entrants from 1989 to 
1998) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Versioning  -2.05**  0.33  -  - 
Portfolio  -4.46**  0.95  -1.47**  0.36 
Mixed  2.37**  0.59  0.76*  0.47 
Herfindahl  -  -  2.26**  0.33 
Cohort1  -0.04  0.45  0.27  0.37 
Cohort2  0.18  0.19  0.33  0.20 
Technology  -0.75**  0.27  -0.71**  0.26 
Alliance  0.08  0.28  0.05  0.04 
Industry  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.04 
US startup  -0.09  0.08  -0.06  0.06 
Dummy variables 
for product niches 
 
YES 
Observations  270  270 
LogLik.  -924.11  -923.29 
Note: * and ** mean 0.10 and 0.05 level of significance, respectively 
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Figure 1: Entry, exit and hazard function, 1989-2000 
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Notes: X axis years, Y1 axis (left) number of firms, Y2 axis (right) hazard 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A. Robust OLS with Versioning and Portfolio as dependent variables 
Dependent variable  Versioning  Portfolio 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Cohort1  -0.16  0.106  0.099  0.141 
Cohort1  0.036  0.064  0.030  0.085 
Technology  0.162**  0.078  0.613**  0.104 
Alliance  0.056**  0.017  0.087**  0.023 
Industry  0.000  0.000  -0.00  0.000 
US startup  0.013  0.06  0.017  0.05 
Constant  0.331*  0.169  0.144  0.224 
Niche dummies  Yes  Yes 
Observations  270  270 
R square  0.254  0.368 
Note: * and ** mean 0.10 and 0.05 level of significance, respectively 
 
 